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The 2016 and 2018 HBO series Westworld by Jonathan Nolan and Lisa Joy may seem the 
epitome of modern, sci-fi entertainment, yet it comes from afar in time. It is based on 
Michael Crichton’s 1973 movie with the same title, which was followed by a somewhat 
weak sequel (Futureworld by Richard T. Heffron, 1976) as well as by a short-lived CBS 
series, Beyond Westworld, in 1980. It narrates the complex vicissitudes of a hyper-
technological theme park – the titular Westworld1 – that recreates a cliché “Wild West,” 
populated by extremely realistic androids (the hosts) who are at the complete service and 
disposal of human visitors (the guests). Some tourists are simply looking for a Hollywood-
like adventure (e.g., a treasure hunt), whereas others seek to play out their most extreme 
fantasies, including rape and gratuitous murder, against an artificial, cinematic background. 
A diverse and hierarchical cohort of technicians steers the resort, often entertaining quite 
different (when not clashing) views on humans, androids, and their relationship. 
Everything is supposed to follow a routine and be under the control of experts; however, 
some hosts begin developing self-awareness and devising their own plans, setting the story 
in motion. HBO’s reimagined Westworld is undoubtedly a feast for the eyes, the ears, and 
the imagination, with its visual inventions, its spectacular setting, its haunting musical 
score, its multifaceted characters, and its plot twists. In addition, Westworld is a feast for 
the mind, thanks to its intertwined and multi-layered symbols (narrative as well as visual), 
to its sophisticated dialogues, and to its highly intellectual quotes, frequently contained in 
the very titles of the episodes, one of which for instance refers to Dante Alighieri’s (1265-
1321) Inferno, while another calls to mind Johann Sebastian Bach’s (1685-1750) music, and 
a third one alludes to Julian Jaynes’s (1920-1997) fascinating if controversial psychological 
theory; respectively, “Contrapasso” (S.1, E.5), “The Well-Tempered Clavier” (S.1, E.9), and 
“The Bicameral Mind” (S.1, E.10). In and through Westworld one discovers a fabulous, 
perhaps even staggering, wealth of philosophical problems concerning competing 
definitions of humanity, creativity, technology, knowledge, ethics (individual and 
corporate), all interwoven and conveyed through a breath-taking, sometimes moving, 
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kaleidoscopic and choral adventure with some extremely gruesome moments. This 
collection of essays, edited by South, Engels and Susanne E. Foster (who unexpectedly 
passed away before publication), which focuses only on the first, 2016 season, is extremely 
worthwhile both for Westworld fans with philosophical inclinations, and for philosophers, 
scientists, and other scholars. The volume coordinates the efforts of twenty-six authors 
with varied disciplinary backgrounds, whose contributions are distributed over seven 
parts. Relevant features of the series, such as the characters’ actions and statements, plot 
elements, or visual devices, are either scrutinized to illustrate classical philosophical 
problems, or used to challenge established philosophical definitions. Some essays support a 
specific thesis; other ones are rather open-ended. All of them are highly readable and 
contain enough clarifications and references to guide even newcomers into things 




Part One, “You Said This Place Was a Game,” explores conceptual issues raised by the fact 
that Westworld is presented and perceived as a game in which the participants take up 
fictional roles. Don Fallis examines notions of pretense, deception, and false belief, using 
the series’ characters and occurrences as counter-examples to household philosophical 
definitions of such concepts, in particular by John Langshaw Austin (1911–1960) and René 
Descartes (1596-1650). Nicholas Moll analyzes the differences between role-games proper 
and Westworld, in which a Game Master is invisible and the games are marked by “violent 
escapism, sexual fantasy, and nostalgic indulgence” (24). Marcus Arvan, by pointing out a 
set of otherwise unexplainable occurrences and patterns (in particular physically 
impossible ones, like lab-workers appearing in the park literally from nowhere), argues that 
all of Westworld is a videogame and, conjuring up (and criticizing) classical ideas put forth 
by Descartes and Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) he blurs the very distinction between 
humans and hosts, as well as between “us” and videogame characters.  
Part Two, “You’re Only Human, After All,” discusses the concept of humanity. Siobhan 
Lyons reflects upon Westworld androids in light of Masahiro Mori’s (1927) famous notion 
of “uncanny valley”: a robot elicits feelings of empathy on our behalf insofar as it resembles 
a human being only up to a point, after which we sense unease because of the extreme 
similarity. Lyons’ essay also touches upon notions put forth by Aristotle (384-322 BCE), 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004); the conclusion is that 
by virtue of their suffering and of their strife to self-improvement, the robots ultimately 
“better exemplify the ideals of humanity than humans do” (48). Jason T. Eberl, relying on 
ideas by, among others, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804), and Harry Frankfurt (1929), discusses how the artificial reality of Westworld is an 
environment that warrants the discovery and cultivation of one’s “true self,” the main 
difference between guests and hosts being that the former, more often than not, live 
without limits and hence bring out their vicious traits, whereas the latter mostly flourish 
and cultivate virtues. Onni Hirvonen uses Westworld to challenge anthropocentrism: the 
“unnecessary and unjustifiable focus on humans while disregarding other beings that may 
be equally relevant and equally capable” (61). He relies in particular on notions of 
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personhood and interpersonal relationships discussed by John Locke (1632-1704), Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), and Daniel Dennett (1942). According to him, the 
androids in Westworld engage in shared social practices and in interpersonal struggles for 
recognition that define them as human above and beyond the (unverifiable) presence in 
them of self-awareness.  
Part Three, “We Can’t Define Consciousness Because Consciousness Does Not Exist,” 
focuses on consciousness. Lucía Carrillo González draws upon the ideas of Alan Turing 
(1912-1954) and John Searle (1932) to raise, without solving it, the question whether 
Westworld androids think and suffer. Bradley Richards takes up the topic where González 
leaves off and, inspired by discussions offered by Thomas Nagel (1937) and David John 
Chalmers (1966), concludes that despite the hosts’ biological similarity to us, we can’t 
conceive of their experience any more than we can conceive of a bat’s, although they may 
become more comprehensible when they gain more awareness of themselves and their 
pasts. Michael Versteeg and Adam Barkman draw upon ideas put forth by Paul Churchland 
(1942), as well as by the aforementioned Dennett and Descartes, to challenge a theory of 
consciousness explicitly voiced in the series by the park’s creator Robert Ford, who states, 
“There is no threshold that makes us greater than the sum of our parts, no inflection point 
at which we become fully alive. We can’t define consciousness because consciousness does 
not exist” (S.1, E.8). In what I believe to be one of the most insightful and clear essays in the 
collection, the authors not only point out the flaws in Ford’s “eliminativism,” but they also 
emphasize the multiple, strident contradictions of such a character who, while denying the 
reality of consciousness (and hence the host/human and guests/creators divide), is in fact 
obsessed with power and control and sacrifices himself so that some hosts get a chance to 
develop self-awareness and autonomy.  
Part Four, “Choices Hanging in the Air Like Ghosts,” deals with matters of free will 
(and choice). Marco Antonio Azevedo and Ana Azevedo draw upon Harry Frankfurt’s 
discussion of freedom and determinism to scrutinize the story of Maeve, a host who 
engages in a journey of self-discovery, as well as of self-determination and liberation. The 
authors point out how her final decision (choosing, while she is already on the train that 
can bring her to the outside world, to go back to the park to look for her “daughter,” 
although aware that their relationship is just an implanted memory) seems to suggest that 
she has shifted from being an agent who only has “first-order desires” (a wanton, in 
Frankfurt’s parlance) to one that has “second-order desires” (a person). Joshua D. Crabill 
follows the vicissitudes of hosts Dolores, Bernard, and Maeve, in the light of ideas put forth 
by Kant and Nietzsche, but also by Plato (428-348 BCE), and Christine M. Korsgaard 
(1952). Maeve’s story seems to illustrate the notion of “reflective distance” between 
instincts/desires and decision-making, that, according to Korsgaard, characterizes beings 
endowed with a “thinking self” (120). Kimberly S. Engels reads the stories of, respectively, 
Maeve and the guest known as the Man in Black, by resorting to the existentialism of Jean-
Paul Sartre (1905-1980); according to such interpretation, both characters qualify as “free” 
not because they are able to act outside a causal chain, but rather because they gradually 
“build themselves” in a world of possibilities that they decide to affirm or deny. This, 
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regardless of the question whether they are “good” or “evil,” or human or machine, 
qualifies them as free agents.  
Part Five, “I’ve Always Loved a Great Story… Lies That Told a Deeper Truth,” employs 
the concept of narrative as an analytical lens. Madeline Muntersbjorn discusses the series 
in the light of Annette C. Baier’s (1929-2012) conjectures that self-awareness, freedom, and 
integrity, are linked to personal interaction in which we experience challenges on behalf of 
our fellows that push us to deconstruct the lies we tell ourselves, as well as to engage in 
self-scrutiny. Other authors referenced by Muntersbjorn include Bertrand Russell (1872-
1970) and Austin, but also Plato and Descartes. I am also inclined to describe this chapter 
as one of the most enlightening. Muntersbjorn is convinced that “humans have less freedom 
than they realize but more freedom than they exercise” (140). She points out that androids 
are “less free than guests” not because they are machines “but because most of their 
interpersonal encounters are deliberately scripted to prevent them from questioning the 
nature of their reality” (143). Another inspiring contribution is that of Lizzie Finnegan, who 
draws upon Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) notion of language games to explore how 
Westworld narratives (i.e., the ones imposed on the hosts) are employed to objectify, 
marginalize, and restrict female robots that, according to her interpretation, “present a 
scenario much closer to the reality of most women than the lives represented by any of the 
human characters” (152). Finnegan observes that the same female hosts can in fact use the 
very features of language to resist and finally dismantle the “Master’s game,” although the 
2016 series still doesn’t narrate the final outcome of such “guerrilla” (159-160). Patricia 
Trapero-Llobera concentrates on memory and imagination and examines Westworld in 
light of Nolan’s previous work, focusing on how characters observe and relate to reality. All 
characters, human or robot are constantly induced by Ford, their creator, to recollect and 
interpret anew their memories, over and over again, in order to shape their selves and 
their actions; this, according to her, has a parallel in the relationship that Nolan constructs 
between himself and his audience. Oliver Lean reflects upon the trials and tribulations of 
the character Bernard in light of concepts respectively elaborated by Franz Brentano 
(1838-1917) and Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who in different but intertwined ways 
reflected upon the mind’s intentionality: what are thoughts “about” or directed towards? 
Additionally drawing upon an essay by Peter Lamarque (1948), Lean ponders over the 
hypothesis that, even upon discovering that a grievous memory of a person’s death is 
actually artificial and implanted it might still make sense to have an emotional reaction to it 
(analogous to someone feeling sympathy for a movie or novel character).  
Part Six, “I Choose to See Beauty,” explores issues of aesthetics. Michael Forest and 
Thomas Beckley-Forest mobilize reflections by Clement Greenberg (1909-1994) as well as 
by Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), in the attempt at answering the question whether 
Westworld qualifies as simple “entertainment commodity” or rather as “high art.” Their 
answer is that, with its depiction of the hosts/Dr. Ford relationship (influenced by the 
Creature/Frankenstein archetype and reflecting the relationship of Westworld as a whole 
with creators Nolan and Joy), and with its constant references to the respective roles of 
artist and audience, Westworld fully counts as modernist art besides making for good 
entertainment. Matthew Meyer draws upon Kenneth Clark’s (1903-1983) distinction 
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between nakedness (the mere fact of not having any clothes on) and artistic nudity and 
explores the usage of the latter in the series, classifying it in a threefold typology: “art 
form,” “sign of (male) dominance,” and “sign of becoming human” (196). Caterina Ludovica 
Baldini draws a fascinating comparison between topics and teachings conveyed by Greek 
tragedy and mythology and by Westworld, as well as their respective narrative devices: she 
astutely points out that, like Greek literary forms, Westworld makes use of repetitions and 
kennings, it links the concepts of understanding and pain (it is not a coincidence that one of 
the characters engaged in a voyage of self-discovery and growth is called Dolores, that is, 
“sorrows”), it contains reflections on the fluidity of time, it displays a modern “assault to 
the Olympus” similar to the one narrated in Hesiod’s Theogony, and it offers a catharsis, 
that is a purging from negative feelings.  
The seventh and last part, “You Can’t Play God Without Being Acquainted With the 
Devil,” deals with the human-machine relationship and its ethics. François Jaquet and 
Florian Cova address the question whether it is right to treat Westworld’s hosts the way 
park managers and guests do. The authors resort to various philosophical views to explain 
the diverse ways in which different characters relate to the androids, especially challenging 
speciesism: “the view that human well-being matters more than that of other creatures” 
(222). Such view must of course rely on a clear human/non-human distinction, yet the 
authors point out how all (implicit) characterizations of such distinction embraced by 
Westworld characters who exploit and abuse the machines are in fact problematic. Their 
pessimistic conclusion is that the series ultimately shows how “faced with the miracle of a 
new life form, most humans still care only about their kind” (227). Anthony Petros 
Spanakos interprets the hosts’ acts of violence in the light of Frantz Fanon’s (1925-1961) 
philosophical criticism of colonialism. Similarly to abused, exploited, “otherized” and 
marginalized native inhabitants of colonized territories revolting against the “white man,” 
the violence that the androids inflict on their human creators is not only practically 
essential to achieve freedom, but also transformative in character: the very fact of spilling 
the masters’ blood and making them suffer is an act of desacralization, a radical 
disturbance of the present order, a first step in a process of mutual recognition, that ushers 
in a new world in which, in fact, both the colonizer and the colonized can be free. Dan 
Dinello, perhaps the most prestigious contributor, author of a pivotal monograph about the 
fear of technology conveyed by sci-fi narratives (Technophobia! Science Fiction Visions of 
Posthuman Technology; Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005) draws upon Hannah 
Arendt’s (1906-1975) discussion of totalitarianism, as well as on the aforementioned 
Fanon, to describe the situation displayed in the park as nothing but a disguised version of 
a concentration and extermination camp. According to Arendt’s famous analysis, 
totalitarian regimes are not defined by a specific political ideology (which could 
indifferently be Nazi or Communist) but rather by the attempt, as the very term indicates, 
at totally controlling the lives of their citizens down to their most personal and intimate 
moments while at the same time depersonalizing them. Furthermore, tyranny is expressed 
by, and played out through, (“mad”) science and technology, like in the case of Auschwitz 
doctor Josef Mengele (1911-1979). According to Dinello’s analysis, the analogy to 
Westworld is manifest: the hosts are thus a symbol of “another species of humanity,” 
marginalized, abused, and exterminated like the Jews in the Nazi camps or the peoples who 
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were colonized by the West. The only way out is thus a violent rebellion and retaliation, 
although, as Dinello acknowledges, the first season does not make it clear whether the 
upheaval will be followed by a spiritual rebirth.  
Evaluation 
I first watched Crichton’s Westworld on TV some twenty-five years ago and it still is one of 
my favorite movies. It deeply impressed (perhaps even obsessed) me as a child, and my 
thirst for more Westworld was definitely not quenched by its low-quality sequels. Nolan’s 
and Joy’s series was a great and welcome surprise: only through the series-format, 
collective creative work, and 21st century visual technology could the potential of 
Crichton’s original intuitions be fully expressed, explored, and expanded. But in the 
meanwhile, having taken up the calling of philosophy professor and scholar, I discovered 
that HBO Westworld, as I pointed out at the beginning, overflows with philosophical 
inspiration. And, as a Westworld employee says while welcoming a guest, “Figuring out 
how it works is half the fun” (S.1, E.2). A statement complemented by Maeve’s, “If you go 
looking for the truth, get the whole thing” (S.1, E.9). However, if you set out to interpret 
Westworld through one and only one theoretical framework, or to make sense of it as 
whole, you can only end up feeling like Wittgenstein’s “old lady,” finding yourself “always 
mislaying something and having to look for it again: now her spectacles, now her keys.”2 
South and Engels, who have chosen Maeve’s quote as the subtitle of their collection, have 
put together a volume that is an excellent attempt at “getting the whole truth” in the only 
way such an enterprise can (perhaps not fully, but meaningfully) be undertaken: by 
appointing a cohort of different scholars provided with different “spectacles” and “keys.”  
If I were hard-pressed to identify one single glitch (to use a typical Westworld term) 
in the collection, I could point only at one that is, perhaps, unavoidable. The essays in the 
collection display some repetitiveness (since inspiring series elements and citations are 
often the same for different contributors).  I was also slightly disturbed by some systematic 
misspellings of non-English words: Westworld creators, with the very titles of their 
episodes (for instance Virtù e fortuna, Episode 3, Season 2, as a reference to Niccolò 
Machiavelli, 1469-1527) remind us that English is not the only language and culture. 
Finally, the collection could have benefited from more engagement with the original movie 
(not to mention the sequel and the CBS series, their lower quality notwithstanding), as well 
as with the problems and topics raised by techno-science (and perhaps Heidegger’s famous 
1954 essay on technology may have been taken as an important reference).  
More substantially, but also as a digression, I must additionally point out that I feel 
that Westworld raises an important methodological issue (or, if you will, a meta-
philosophical one) which is particularly relevant for a journal of science fiction and 
philosophy and one which could have been better explored in the collection at hand. 
Consider the scientific/logical incongruences pointed out by the collection’s contributor 
Marcus Arvan in order to argue that Westworld, not conforming to known physical laws, is 
in fact a videogame. This seems to me, in fact, just the tip of a philosophical iceberg. No 
science fiction movie can be said to be completely devoid of elements that are located in a 
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“gray zone”: the original movie left completely unexplained how guests were protected 
from ricochets and blade-inflicted wounds. To be sure, I am not referring here to plot-holes 
that may be explained with further narratives (i.e., through leaps of imagination on behalf 
of the inspired audience), nor to crude technical bloopers. I am here referring to somewhat 
subtler and more insidious questions: in HBO Westworld, for instance, how can orders be 
transmitted and implemented instantaneously from the managers to the androids? How can 
androids be repaired so rapidly keeping up with the guests’ destructive sprees? To be sure, 
any science fiction narrative can be philosophically discussed and dissected by pointing out 
the problems and topics it conjures up (such is the case of the collection’s essays focusing 
on oppression and the use of violence), or it can be the object of thematic/cultural 
comparisons (as it happens in the essays discussing Westworld and ancient Greek drama, 
or 20th century totalitarianism), or it can be examined aesthetically (such is the case of the 
study of nudity and nakedness). However, the question also arises: is it philosophically 
legitimate and fruitful to treat some of the situations displayed in such a filmic narrative 
like mental experiments or hypothetical scenarios, and use them to discuss, for instance, 
issues of humanity, voluntary choice, and the like when those very situations violate, 
unintentionally or for narrative purposes, the known laws of reality – physical, logical, etc.? 
What is, in other words, the philosophical value of a discussion based on a narrative that, 
on close inspection, makes reference to ultimately impossible occurrences and scenarios? 
This challenge seems to me especially urgent when it comes to cyborg-stories displaying 
physically unwarranted situations that surely make for great, imagination-sparking stories 
but not for consistent thinking, since they violate limits that in reality will never be 
transcended. As Despina Kakoudaki points out, movie depictions of cyborgs and computers 
more often than not display extreme disembodiment: “Fictional depictions of present and 
future technology often presume that all aspects of life have been translated into packets of 
information […] without gaps in coverage” and “depictions of a particular technology in 
fiction and film tend to ignore the material conditions required for its operation.”3 Could 
not such speculations even be deemed misleading, since they induce us to reflect upon the 
impossible, while losing sight of the actual ways in which technology may impact our lives 
(and even in the near future)? In sum, I feel that this problem should be given more 
attention in general, and that it should have been preliminarily considered by some 
contributors in particular.  
Perhaps a new volume, focusing on the second series with all its thematic and 
narrative expansions, but also on some issues from the first series that were left suspended 
or uninvestigated, will address some of these questions. Or shall we rather claim, with 
Robert Ford, that “we are done, that this is as good as we’re going to get”? Philosophically 
speaking, it is hard to believe.  
On a final note, a piece of advice for Westworld aficionados with a scholarly 
background and interests: besides this precious compilation, definitely a must-read, there 
is a wealth of other greatly inspiring academic essays. I can briefly mention here at least 
three, all published in 2017. Agnieszka Kiejziewicz drew an interesting comparison 
between Westworld and the British series Black Mirror (created by Charlie Brooke), taking 
as a reference point the concept of technophobia; that is, fear of technology4 which, 
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according to such analysis, seems rather absent from the HBO series, thus opening 
interesting vistas for a comparison with the 1973 movie. Reto Winckler explored the 
analogies between Westworld and Shakespearean theatre, in particular in reference to the 
world-as-stage metaphor; his essay may be fruitfully read together with Caterina Ludovica 
Baldini’s analysis.5 Deborah M. Netolicky used Westworld to explore and criticize scholarly 
identity and academic writing (in fact, upon attentive reflection, also a field where one may 
experience issues of coercion, oppression, and exploitation, although perhaps less 
manifestly and physically than in a colonized country).6 Just a few gems, that may have very 
well featured in South’s and Engels’s collection. 
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